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We study the rational preferences of an agent participating to a mechanism whose outcome is a weak order among participants. We propose a set of self-interest axioms and characterize the resulting preference theories.

Preference theories on weak orders / Faella, M.; Sauro, L.. - 2509:(2020), pp. 53-58.

Preference theories on weak orders

Faella M.;Sauro L.
2020

Abstract

We study the rational preferences of an agent participating to a mechanism whose outcome is a weak order among participants. We propose a set of self-interest axioms and characterize the resulting preference theories.
2020
Preference theories on weak orders / Faella, M.; Sauro, L.. - 2509:(2020), pp. 53-58.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/800008
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