L'autonomia decisionale del cancelliere tedesco tra resistenza istituzionale e gestione della crisi

In recent decades, Western democracies have witnessed substantial changes in the role played by political leaders. In particular, prime ministers have benefited from increasing decision-making autonomy in both the cabinet and the party, to the detriment of party organizations. In this context, Germany represents a deviant case, when compared to other West European democracies: if, on the one hand, the personalization of politics has provided the chancellor with further visibility in the media, on the other hand strong political parties and a complex system of institutional veto points have remained significant sources of limitation to monocratic government. Nevertheless, the policy autonomy of the head of government has increased in many fields: how has this been possible? This chapter investigates how German chancellors have used domestic and international crises as windows of opportunity to find new room for maneuver and promoting crucial policy turns, often in opposition to their parties. The analysis focuses on two chancellors: Gerard Schröder and Angela Merkel, whose governments are contextualized within the executive history of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949. Particular attention is paid to Merkel’s management of the Covid-19 crisis and the institutional constraints on her action. Findings show that a relative informal strengthening process of the figure of the chancellor has not been paired by relevant changes in chancellor’s normative powers. From a comparative perspective, this result is interpreted as a signal of continuity in the ability of German political institutions to work as counterweights vis-à-vis more personal forms of leadership.