The right to work as a social right in the Italian Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A constitutional perspective

The contribution moves from a recollection of the main ways in which the phrase «social rights» has been interpreted by Italian scholars in constitutional law. With some measure of simplification, the foremost ideas on social rights can be grouped into «traditional theories» – those which maintain that social rights should be regarded as structurally different from civil rights, since the former, unlike the latter, require public provisions to be set in place – and «innovative theories» – those which challenge the idea of a structural difference between civil and social rights. Against this background, a preference is expressed for the «traditional theories». On these grounds, it is possible to argue that the right to work, as construed by the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court on the basis of art. 4, par. 1, of the Constitution, must be regarded as a fully-fledged social right, which imposes on public powers an obligation to set forth legislative measures meant to promote and protect employment. Having thus outlined the legal meaning of the right to work in Italian constitutional law, such meaning is confronted with the one attributed to the right to work in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as in the so-called European Pillar of Social Rights, with a view to identifying the main similarities and differences between the national and European system.