“Ratio” sous différentes formes: une perspective historico-philosophique sur la rationalité

“Ratio” is a fundamental notion of human sciences which has been interpreted and re-elaborated in different ways by thinkers. In its various meanings (ontological, epistemological, etc.), forms (pure, practical, aesthetic, etc.) and connotations (“strong” or “weak” reason, substantive reason, etc.), it plays a central role, not only in the early modern era (from Montaigne and Descartes to Voltaire and Kant), but also in the 19th and 20th centuries and today as well (consider for example Habermas’ conception of communicative rationality). In an investigation into rationality and its uses in the light of certain present-day dilemmas, it is useful to question the meanings and uses of this concept that have historically been developed. This type of analysis is inspired by the work of theorists active at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt from the 1920s onwards, in particular by Max Horkheimer. In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944 and 1947) he proposes – with Adorno – an evaluation of the social and psychic costs of modern rationalism against the background of reason’s vicissitudes in archaic myth. In Eclipse of Reason (1947) he distinguishes between an objective reason, which is supposed to exist not only in man’s mind, but also in human relationships, and a subjective, instrumental reason, which does not pay attention to the rationality of ends, but only to the efficacy of means. This paper aims to analyse a key concept of philosophy and human sciences, its nuances and variations (reason, rationality, rationalization) and its critical re-elaboration in the 20th century by thematizing the shift from Kantian reason of Enlightenment inspiration to modernist razionalization, characterized by an increasing doubtfulness of philosophy’s ability to mediate between theory and practice (Schecter 2012). From this perspective, it is essential to distinguish “rationality” from “rationalization”. Rationality is the incessant dialogue going on in our mind that creates logical structures and applies them to the world, to this real world; it includes the capacity for self-criticism without which it can become rationalization. The latter tends to close reality in a coherent system in such a way that what, in reality, creates friction with that system, is put aside, reduced to mere illusion or appearance. If rationality remains open and inclusive, rationalization is closed in on itself: it believes it can embrace the universe as a whole; it is the logic that is coextensive with the real (Morin 1996, 2005). It tends to exclude everything that does not harmonize with its paradigm, and reject it in a sphere considered as non-rational and configured as an alterity which should be ignored or neutralized. Hence, when we reflect on different choices that people make in a certain era, as those choices which shape the world in which we see an increasing return to the nation-state as an ideal, and to a closing off and controlling of contact with anyone perceived as different, we should also consider which paradigm or declination of “ratio” is imposed at that time, and shed light on the non-emancipatory or even destructive tension that is present in a certain model of rationality.