Reason and Revelation in Malebranche and Locke

My paper deals with the question of the relationship between reason and revelation in Malebranche and Locke. First of all, I would like to examine Malebranche’s position. In The Search after Truth (first edition: 1674-75), the Oratorian suggests that there is a common basis for both domains but, in his first work, he insists rather on the separation of reason and revelation, whereas in later texts he stresses the continuity and harmony between the two orders. Moreover, I think that it is essential to analyse the conception of Malebranche according to which man is the “animal Rationis particeps” and his arguments to demonstrate the necessity of a universal, eternal and divine Reason. In this regard, I will look at the objectivity of mathematical truths and basic principles of ethics (I will consider, in particular, the 10th Elucidation on The Search after Truth, 1678). Secondly, I will consider Locke’s text An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God (1695, published posthumously, 1706), in particular the paragraphs in which the English philosopher calls into question the Malebranchean theory of universal Reason by affirming the necessity to distinguish our understanding from God’s understanding and stating that man does not apprehend anything through God’s understanding, neither can he share His knowledge. But I will also examine the fourth book of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), in which Locke affirms that reason is a natural revelation by means of which God communicates to man that portion of truth which is appropriate to his faculties. Even if Locke calls into question the Malebranchean doctrine of universal Reason, as does Malebranche, but in a different manner, he stresses a certain continuity between reason and revelation (cf. Essay, Book IV, Chap. XIX, § 4) and finally affirms that revelation must be judged by reason (§ 14). Albeit with a different meaning, he seems to echo the Malebranchean idea according to which faith is bound to pass away whereas intelligence exists eternally. In Chapter 14 of The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), Locke affirms that any norm which should be universally useful and to which men should conform their behaviour, must have its authority either from reason or revelation. Indeed, in this text too, the English philosopher juxtaposes the two fields and confirms that reason can give its suffrage to truth discovered by revelation. Finally, by examining these texts and reconsidering Locke’s critical remarks on Malebranche, I would like to stress the different perspectives of two philosophers, but I would also like to show that they are not in total contrast with each other on this topic (reason and revelation), particularly if we emphasize (1) the idea – shared by the two authors – that there is some form of communication between God and men and (2) the particular way in which Locke interprets the age-old question of the existence of a universal Reason constituting the rational skeleton or texture of the world, when, in An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, he affirms that the Malebranchean infinite reason can be considered as the infinite unchangeable relations which are in things.