This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424–440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit (C) or not to commit (NC) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs à la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm’s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.

Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach / Buccella, D.; Fanti, L.; Gori, L.; Sodini, M.. - In: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 1572-9338. - (2023). [10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1]

Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Sodini M.
2023

Abstract

This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424–440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit (C) or not to commit (NC) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs à la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm’s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.
2023
Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach / Buccella, D.; Fanti, L.; Gori, L.; Sodini, M.. - In: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 1572-9338. - (2023). [10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/947400
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