Based on empirical research focused on the phenomenon of corruption in Italy. The purpose of the contribution is to show the different models that are made of corruption pacts according to the actors who regulate them. The basis of the judicial documents was provided by the National Anti-Mafia Directorate (DNAA), the Court of Auditors, and a sample of Courts of Appeal from different jurisdictional districts. The information collected offers an account of the influence that the various mafias have on public policies and the ability to circumvent current legislation. The contribution underlines the existing interpretative limits and why they do not explain to what extent great and small corruption are related.

Corruption and policy-making. How corrupt models favor the mafias. The case study of Italy / Di Gennaro, Giacomo; Aurilia, Roberta. - Unico:(2022), pp. 1-21.

Corruption and policy-making. How corrupt models favor the mafias. The case study of Italy

Di Gennaro, Giacomo;Aurilia, Roberta
2022

Abstract

Based on empirical research focused on the phenomenon of corruption in Italy. The purpose of the contribution is to show the different models that are made of corruption pacts according to the actors who regulate them. The basis of the judicial documents was provided by the National Anti-Mafia Directorate (DNAA), the Court of Auditors, and a sample of Courts of Appeal from different jurisdictional districts. The information collected offers an account of the influence that the various mafias have on public policies and the ability to circumvent current legislation. The contribution underlines the existing interpretative limits and why they do not explain to what extent great and small corruption are related.
2022
978-1-80356-696-2
Corruption and policy-making. How corrupt models favor the mafias. The case study of Italy / Di Gennaro, Giacomo; Aurilia, Roberta. - Unico:(2022), pp. 1-21.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/899823
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