We study the rational preferences of agents participating in a mechanism whose outcome is a weak order among participants. We propose a set of self-interest axioms and characterize the mutual relationships between all subsets thereof. We then assume that the mechanism can assign monetary rewards to the agents, in a way that is consistent with the weak order. We show that the mechanism can induce specific classes of preferences by suitably choosing the assigned rewards, even in the absence of tie breaking.
Preferences over rankings and how to control them using rewards / Faella, M.; Sauro, L.. - 325:(2020), pp. 59-66. (Intervento presentato al convegno 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2020, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 tenutosi a esp nel 2020) [10.3233/FAIA200076].
Preferences over rankings and how to control them using rewards
Faella M.
;Sauro L.
2020
Abstract
We study the rational preferences of agents participating in a mechanism whose outcome is a weak order among participants. We propose a set of self-interest axioms and characterize the mutual relationships between all subsets thereof. We then assume that the mechanism can assign monetary rewards to the agents, in a way that is consistent with the weak order. We show that the mechanism can induce specific classes of preferences by suitably choosing the assigned rewards, even in the absence of tie breaking.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
