The democratic quality of EU governance: between formal and informal systems of dialogue.

The European Union is founded on the idea of "representative democracy". From 1979 its citizens are directly represented in the European Parliament, but Union democracy is equally based on indirect forms of representation especially through the European Council and the Council, two institutions whose members will be democratically accountable to their national parliaments. The good functioning of the Union democracy assumes, therefore, the good functioning of the democratic institutions of each Member State. Therefore, what is the role and relationship between the European and national parliaments in the democratic functioning of the Union? Do they exercise distinct or complementary functions? The malfunctioning of the European system party gives too much space to others forms of representations of interest like lobbies? These questions have gained particular relevance in the recent years. In this framework, this paper analyses not only how the Lisbon Treaty conferred new functions upon national parliaments, but also how the coordination of fiscal and economic policies at European level has led to significant restrictions of the national parliamentary powers. Basing on neo-institutionalist approaches, this article discusses institutional capacities and political motivation seen as the two key explanatory factors in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs.