Abstract. New concepts of approximate mixed solutions for hierarchical saddle-point problems are introduced in the situation in which the leader cannot influence the followers and minimizes the worst, under the lack of convexity assumptions. Then sufficient conditions for the existence of such approximate solutions and convergence of the corresponding values are presented.
Mixed strategies for hierarchical zero-sum games / Mallozzi, Lina; Morgan, Jacqueline. - STAMPA. - 6:(2001), pp. 65-77.
Mixed strategies for hierarchical zero-sum games
MALLOZZI, LINA;MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2001
Abstract
Abstract. New concepts of approximate mixed solutions for hierarchical saddle-point problems are introduced in the situation in which the leader cannot influence the followers and minimizes the worst, under the lack of convexity assumptions. Then sufficient conditions for the existence of such approximate solutions and convergence of the corresponding values are presented.File in questo prodotto:
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