The paper describes the historical evolution of the notion of central bank's indipendence, underlining the differences between the traditional positions and those recently proposed by the New Classical and New Keynesian Economics. It points out the existence of a possible contraddiction between the forms of independence suggested by the recent literature and the principle of representative democracy, arguing that there are ways to avoid the emergence of this contraddiction.

Central bank independence and democracy: a historical perspective / Panico, Carlo; Rizza, M. O.. - STAMPA. - (2004), pp. 447-467.

Central bank independence and democracy: a historical perspective

PANICO, CARLO;
2004

Abstract

The paper describes the historical evolution of the notion of central bank's indipendence, underlining the differences between the traditional positions and those recently proposed by the New Classical and New Keynesian Economics. It points out the existence of a possible contraddiction between the forms of independence suggested by the recent literature and the principle of representative democracy, arguing that there are ways to avoid the emergence of this contraddiction.
2004
07546 4000 0
Central bank independence and democracy: a historical perspective / Panico, Carlo; Rizza, M. O.. - STAMPA. - (2004), pp. 447-467.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/114863
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