Knut Wicksell's 1896 fiscal theory grounds the legitimacy of taxation in unanimous consent, yet insists that genuine consent presupposes a just distribution of property and income. This talk reconstructs the resulting tension between procedural legitimacy and distributive justice, a tension Wicksell acknowledged but never resolved. It then traces the divergent paths taken by his successors: Musgrave's redistributive architecture of public finance, Buchanan's constitutional proceduralism, and the preference-revelation problem that became central to the theory of mechanism design.
The Impossible Unanimity: Knut Wicksell's Fiscal Federalism / Filoso, V.. - (2026). (STOREP 3rd Annual Conference Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza — Federico II 26 Giugno 2026).
The Impossible Unanimity: Knut Wicksell's Fiscal Federalism
Valerio Filoso
Primo
2026
Abstract
Knut Wicksell's 1896 fiscal theory grounds the legitimacy of taxation in unanimous consent, yet insists that genuine consent presupposes a just distribution of property and income. This talk reconstructs the resulting tension between procedural legitimacy and distributive justice, a tension Wicksell acknowledged but never resolved. It then traces the divergent paths taken by his successors: Musgrave's redistributive architecture of public finance, Buchanan's constitutional proceduralism, and the preference-revelation problem that became central to the theory of mechanism design.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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Wicksell Slides.pdf
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Descrizione: Slides talk
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