This paper examines the economic risks and distributional consequences of implementing Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in public tax collection, focusing on the Italian case. While AI-powered solutions offer significant potential for improving administrative efficiency and revenue recovery, they introduce substantial challenges regarding algorithmic fairness, transparency, and social equity. The study first evaluates the adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks, including the EU AI Act and Italian legislative reforms, finding significant gaps in addressing algorithmic discrimination in fiscal contexts. Through a theoretical model of taxpayer–tax authority negotiations, the paper demonstrates how AI systems relying on biased training data or latent discriminatory variables can generate market failures in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. The model reveals that algorithmic discrimination creates perverse incentives: Honest taxpayers from disadvantaged groups may face higher rejection rates for settlement offers due to artificially deflated enforcement probability estimates, while strategic actors exploit these biases to secure favourable terms through manipulative strategies. This leads to Pareto-suboptimal equilibria that reduce fiscal efficiency and exacerbate economic inequality. Findings show that even taxpayers with identical observable characteristics may face unequal treatment when latent bias indicators penalise certain demographic groups, violating principles of vertical equity and administrative impartiality. This research contributes to the literature on AI governance in public finance by integrating economic theory with legal analysis to propose policy solutions that balance technological efficiency with distributional justice. The study concludes with recommendations for developing transparent, auditable, and contestable algorithmic models in tax enforcement, supported by regulatory frameworks codifying fairness principles.

On the economic effects of AI-powered collection systems: the Italian case / Bucciarelli, Edgardo; Villani, Salvatore; Ascatigno, Aurora. - (2025). ( 22nd conference of the Italian Chapter of AIS (Association for Information Systems – www.aisnet.org) Castellanza (VA) Octorber 17th-18th, 2025).

On the economic effects of AI-powered collection systems: the Italian case

Salvatore Villani
Secondo
Conceptualization
;
2025

Abstract

This paper examines the economic risks and distributional consequences of implementing Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in public tax collection, focusing on the Italian case. While AI-powered solutions offer significant potential for improving administrative efficiency and revenue recovery, they introduce substantial challenges regarding algorithmic fairness, transparency, and social equity. The study first evaluates the adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks, including the EU AI Act and Italian legislative reforms, finding significant gaps in addressing algorithmic discrimination in fiscal contexts. Through a theoretical model of taxpayer–tax authority negotiations, the paper demonstrates how AI systems relying on biased training data or latent discriminatory variables can generate market failures in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. The model reveals that algorithmic discrimination creates perverse incentives: Honest taxpayers from disadvantaged groups may face higher rejection rates for settlement offers due to artificially deflated enforcement probability estimates, while strategic actors exploit these biases to secure favourable terms through manipulative strategies. This leads to Pareto-suboptimal equilibria that reduce fiscal efficiency and exacerbate economic inequality. Findings show that even taxpayers with identical observable characteristics may face unequal treatment when latent bias indicators penalise certain demographic groups, violating principles of vertical equity and administrative impartiality. This research contributes to the literature on AI governance in public finance by integrating economic theory with legal analysis to propose policy solutions that balance technological efficiency with distributional justice. The study concludes with recommendations for developing transparent, auditable, and contestable algorithmic models in tax enforcement, supported by regulatory frameworks codifying fairness principles.
2025
On the economic effects of AI-powered collection systems: the Italian case / Bucciarelli, Edgardo; Villani, Salvatore; Ascatigno, Aurora. - (2025). ( 22nd conference of the Italian Chapter of AIS (Association for Information Systems – www.aisnet.org) Castellanza (VA) Octorber 17th-18th, 2025).
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Manuscript_On the economic effects of AI-powered collection systems the Italian case_300825.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Manuscript submitted
Tipologia: Altro materiale allegato
Licenza: Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 517.06 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
517.06 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Program for Friday, October 17th.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: ITAIS Programme - October 17th
Tipologia: Altro materiale allegato
Licenza: Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 834.15 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
834.15 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
VILLANI S. - ITAIS 2025 - SLIDES - 17-10-2025 - BRIEF VERS. - ENG - DEF.DEF..pptx

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Slides presentation
Tipologia: Altro materiale allegato
Licenza: Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 852.69 kB
Formato Microsoft Powerpoint XML
852.69 kB Microsoft Powerpoint XML   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/1013644
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact