Die Hobbes’sche Gleichheit als Zusammenprall ,nicht existierender Rechte‘ nach der Kritik von Samuel Pufendorf

This contribution aims to analyse Samuel Pufendorf’s critique of the Hobbesian concept of equality as the equal exercise of natural rights.In the first section of this article, which addresses the basis of equality, Pufendorf applies his fundamental distinction between obliging and coercing to the Hobbesian foundational principle of equality, namely the right to all things, or ius in omnia. Thus, Pufendorf interprets Hobbes’ ius in omnia not as a right in the true sense, which, in the social context, should always be correlated with duty but as a mere power to coerce that fails to acknowledge the other as a moral subject. This power would ultimately lead, in reality, to a futile clash between ‘non-existent rights’. The second paragraph explores the subjective aspect of equality according to the two authors. For Pufendorf, it is the respect (dignatio) for the other as an equally free and rational being, while for Hobbes, it is the mutual fear among men.