We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players—constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games. We investigate the properties of these TU-representations and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the (Formula presented.) -measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure.
Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks / Gilles, R. P.; Mallozzi, L.. - In: GAMES. - ISSN 2073-4336. - 14:64(2023), pp. 1-19. [10.3390/g14050064]
Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks
Gilles R. P.;Mallozzi L.
2023
Abstract
We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players—constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games. We investigate the properties of these TU-representations and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the (Formula presented.) -measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
