Naturalizing Negation. A Challenge for Cognitive Phenomenology about Phenomenological Possess Conditions of Logical Vocabulary

The negation constitutes one of the main troubles for attempts to naturalise the semantics of the logical vocabulary, as shown by the problems related to the interpretation of disjunction in the treatment of error (Fodor) or to the definition of contraries in the analysis of reidentification abilities (Millikan). There seems to be no way out between “no (naturalised) negation, no grip of logic on the world” and “no (truth-functional) negation, no logic”. Unexpected help may come from the cognitive phenomenology of negation. For three reasons: 1) Firstly, because it allows a distinction to be made between semantic analysis, identification of the conditions of possession and psychology of the acquisition of the notion of negation, a distinction whose absence produces many misunderstandings between those who support a naturalisation of semantics and those who oppose it. 2) Then because it places negation at the level of the contrast between beliefs, a terrain that is hostile to some naturalizers. 3) Finally, because it makes it possible to define a peculiar type of liberalised naturalisation of semantics and, consequently, to present a hypothesis for the naturalization of cognitive phenomenology.