Our main objects are two-person, multi-stage, Stackelberg games. We consider feedback solutions. Existence and variational stability of equilibria have been established under minimal assumptions when the optimal responses are unique.
MULTI-STAGE HIERARCHICAL GAMES: EXISTENCE AND STABILITY WHEN THE OPTIMAL RESPONSES ARE UNIQUE / D’Auria, Nunzia Antonietta. - In: FAR EAST JOURNAL OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 0972-0960. - 116:2(2023), pp. 133-147. [10.17654/0972096023008]
MULTI-STAGE HIERARCHICAL GAMES: EXISTENCE AND STABILITY WHEN THE OPTIMAL RESPONSES ARE UNIQUE
D’Auria, Nunzia Antonietta
2023
Abstract
Our main objects are two-person, multi-stage, Stackelberg games. We consider feedback solutions. Existence and variational stability of equilibria have been established under minimal assumptions when the optimal responses are unique.File in questo prodotto:
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