This paper proposes a decentralized hierarchical price function design for charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) based on the reverse Stackelberg mechanism. We consider an aggregator who purchases energy from the wholesale energy market. The aggregator acts as the leader for a group of PEVs and determines the price of energy versus consumption at each hour a day as its decision function. In the followers level, the optimal charging strategies of the PEVs are coupled through the electricity price. The PEVs in a group are considered to cooperate in finding their Nash-Pareto-optimal charging strategy, by minimizing a social cost function. We propose a decentralized algorithm by combination of mean-filed control and reverse Stackelberg game to find an optimal linear price function while the followers' strategies converge to varepsilon{N}-Nash equilibrium point of the game.
Decentralized charging coordination of plug-in electric vehicles based on reverse stackelberg game / Tajeddini, M. A.; Kebriaei, H.; Glielmo, L.. - (2019), pp. 3414-3419. (Intervento presentato al convegno 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019 tenutosi a ita nel 2019) [10.23919/ECC.2019.8795735].
Decentralized charging coordination of plug-in electric vehicles based on reverse stackelberg game
Glielmo L.
2019
Abstract
This paper proposes a decentralized hierarchical price function design for charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) based on the reverse Stackelberg mechanism. We consider an aggregator who purchases energy from the wholesale energy market. The aggregator acts as the leader for a group of PEVs and determines the price of energy versus consumption at each hour a day as its decision function. In the followers level, the optimal charging strategies of the PEVs are coupled through the electricity price. The PEVs in a group are considered to cooperate in finding their Nash-Pareto-optimal charging strategy, by minimizing a social cost function. We propose a decentralized algorithm by combination of mean-filed control and reverse Stackelberg game to find an optimal linear price function while the followers' strategies converge to varepsilon{N}-Nash equilibrium point of the game.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.