It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty.
Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities / Graziano, Maria Gabriella; Meo, Claudia; Yannelis, Nicholas C.. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN. - ISSN 2196-1093. - (2022). [10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x]
Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
Graziano, Maria Gabriella;Meo, Claudia
;
2022
Abstract
It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty.File in questo prodotto:
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