Using data for Italy, I show that cash thresholds that forbid the use of cash for big transactions are effective tools to reduce cash income and cash circulation. Less cash income, in turn, hinders tax evasion. I propose an estimate of the increase in tax revenue implied by the empirically estimated reduction of cash income determined by the thresholds.

Cash Thresholds, Cash Expenditure and Tax Evasion

Francesco Flaviano Russo
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Abstract

Using data for Italy, I show that cash thresholds that forbid the use of cash for big transactions are effective tools to reduce cash income and cash circulation. Less cash income, in turn, hinders tax evasion. I propose an estimate of the increase in tax revenue implied by the empirically estimated reduction of cash income determined by the thresholds.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/902015
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