In this paper, we study the generalization of (Nash) equilibrium and dominance solvability to interval fuzzy games in strategic form. We show that the more straightforward generalizations of these concepts do not inherit their most relevant results, either in terms of existence or refinement. To efficiently handle the fuzziness of the payoffs, we use the Hurwicz criterion and introduce new equilibrium concepts and dominance solutions which greatly overcome these drawbacks.
Equilibrium and dominance in fuzzy games / Mallozzi, Lina; Vidal-Puga, Juan. - In: FUZZY SETS AND SYSTEMS. - ISSN 0165-0114. - 458:(2023), pp. 94-107. [10.1016/j.fss.2022.06.027]
Equilibrium and dominance in fuzzy games
Mallozzi, Lina;
2023
Abstract
In this paper, we study the generalization of (Nash) equilibrium and dominance solvability to interval fuzzy games in strategic form. We show that the more straightforward generalizations of these concepts do not inherit their most relevant results, either in terms of existence or refinement. To efficiently handle the fuzziness of the payoffs, we use the Hurwicz criterion and introduce new equilibrium concepts and dominance solutions which greatly overcome these drawbacks.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
