We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games—referred to as social purpose games—in which the payoffs depend separately on a player’s own strategy (individual bene- fits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players (social benefits) weighted by an individual benefit parameter. This structure allows for an asymmetric assess- ment of a common social benefit across players. We show that these games have a weighted potential, and we investigate its properties. We investigate the payoff structure and the unique- ness of Nash equilibria and social optima. Furthermore, following the literature on partial cooperation, we investigate the leadership of a single coalition of cooperators, while the rest of players act as non-cooperative followers. In particular, we show that social purpose games admit the emergence of a stable coalition of cooperators for the subclass of strict social pur- pose games. As a particular application, we study a standard formulation of the tragedy of the commons. We show that there emerges a single stable coalition of cooperators that curbs the over-exploitation of the common resource.

Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games

Robert P. Gilles;Lina Mallozzi;Roberta Messalli
2022

Abstract

We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games—referred to as social purpose games—in which the payoffs depend separately on a player’s own strategy (individual bene- fits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players (social benefits) weighted by an individual benefit parameter. This structure allows for an asymmetric assess- ment of a common social benefit across players. We show that these games have a weighted potential, and we investigate its properties. We investigate the payoff structure and the unique- ness of Nash equilibria and social optima. Furthermore, following the literature on partial cooperation, we investigate the leadership of a single coalition of cooperators, while the rest of players act as non-cooperative followers. In particular, we show that social purpose games admit the emergence of a stable coalition of cooperators for the subclass of strict social pur- pose games. As a particular application, we study a standard formulation of the tragedy of the commons. We show that there emerges a single stable coalition of cooperators that curbs the over-exploitation of the common resource.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/890792
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact