We consider a set of voters who express preferences about two alternatives, indifferences included. We characterize the class of all strategy-proof and anonymous social choice functions by means of a geometric property related to an integer triangular grid representing the number of voters supporting each of the two alternatives.

Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof / Basile, Achille; Surekha, Rao; K. P. S., Bhaskara Rao. - In: MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 0165-4896. - 116:(2022), pp. 85-91. [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.01.001]

Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof

Basile Achille
;
2022

Abstract

We consider a set of voters who express preferences about two alternatives, indifferences included. We characterize the class of all strategy-proof and anonymous social choice functions by means of a geometric property related to an integer triangular grid representing the number of voters supporting each of the two alternatives.
2022
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof / Basile, Achille; Surekha, Rao; K. P. S., Bhaskara Rao. - In: MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 0165-4896. - 116:(2022), pp. 85-91. [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.01.001]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/868787
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