In the era of asymmetrical conflicts, information and communication technologies (ICT) play an essential role due to their importance in the manipulation and conditioning of public opinion.[1] Several threats are linked to the use of ICT but, in terms of interstate, strategic competition, one of the main dangers is represented by socalled “cyber election interference” (i.e., cyber election-meddling activities carried out by foreign states to influence the electorate of a target state through the diffusion of “fake news” or “alternative truths,” principally via the media and social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)). The aim of this paper is to clarify whether and when this kind of interference constitutes a breach of international obligations—in particular, of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a state—and to envisage possible lawful responses under international law by states targeted by said interference.

Fake news, (dis)information and principle of non-intervention. Scope, Limits and Possible Responses to Cyber Election Interference in Times of Competition / Rotondo, A.; Salvati, P.. - In: THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW. - ISSN 2474-2120. - (2019). (Intervento presentato al convegno 2018 International Conference on Cyber Conflict U.S. (CyCon U.S.) - Cyber Conflict During Competition).

Fake news, (dis)information and principle of non-intervention. Scope, Limits and Possible Responses to Cyber Election Interference in Times of Competition

A. Rotondo
;
2019

Abstract

In the era of asymmetrical conflicts, information and communication technologies (ICT) play an essential role due to their importance in the manipulation and conditioning of public opinion.[1] Several threats are linked to the use of ICT but, in terms of interstate, strategic competition, one of the main dangers is represented by socalled “cyber election interference” (i.e., cyber election-meddling activities carried out by foreign states to influence the electorate of a target state through the diffusion of “fake news” or “alternative truths,” principally via the media and social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)). The aim of this paper is to clarify whether and when this kind of interference constitutes a breach of international obligations—in particular, of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a state—and to envisage possible lawful responses under international law by states targeted by said interference.
2019
Fake news, (dis)information and principle of non-intervention. Scope, Limits and Possible Responses to Cyber Election Interference in Times of Competition / Rotondo, A.; Salvati, P.. - In: THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW. - ISSN 2474-2120. - (2019). (Intervento presentato al convegno 2018 International Conference on Cyber Conflict U.S. (CyCon U.S.) - Cyber Conflict During Competition).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/862467
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