We introduce the concept of complete sets of preferences, that covers interesting cases like single peaked preferences, rich domains admitting regular social choice functions, and universal domains, and show that strategy-proofness is sufficient to obtain the preference reversal property when the voters’ feasible set of preferences is complete.
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives / Basile, Achille; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.; Rao, Surekha. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 208:(2021). [10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110083]
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
Achille Basile
;
2021
Abstract
We introduce the concept of complete sets of preferences, that covers interesting cases like single peaked preferences, rich domains admitting regular social choice functions, and universal domains, and show that strategy-proofness is sufficient to obtain the preference reversal property when the voters’ feasible set of preferences is complete.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
