This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot, two-player, finite-action, strategic-form Common Interest games. A single round of costless unlimited preplay communication is allowed. Players are restricted to using strategies that are computable in the sense of Church's Thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations that are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector that survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C79. © 1999 Academic Press.
Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games / Anderlini, L.. - In: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. - ISSN 0899-8256. - 27:1(1999), pp. 1-37. [10.1006/game.1998.0652]
Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games
Anderlini L.
1999
Abstract
This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot, two-player, finite-action, strategic-form Common Interest games. A single round of costless unlimited preplay communication is allowed. Players are restricted to using strategies that are computable in the sense of Church's Thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations that are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector that survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C79. © 1999 Academic Press.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
