The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions – CSP scfs, for short – whose range is a subset of cardinality two of an arbitrary set A of alternatives. The study is conducted in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference among elements of A, and the domain of the scfs consists of preference profiles over a society V of arbitrary cardinality. A representation formula for the two-valued CSP scfs is obtained that provides the structure of such functions.
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions / Basile, Achille; Rao, Surekha; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0304-4068. - (2021). [10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102474]
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
Achille Basile
;
2021
Abstract
The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions – CSP scfs, for short – whose range is a subset of cardinality two of an arbitrary set A of alternatives. The study is conducted in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference among elements of A, and the domain of the scfs consists of preference profiles over a society V of arbitrary cardinality. A representation formula for the two-valued CSP scfs is obtained that provides the structure of such functions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
