We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy proof binary social choice functions. We give this characterization in the case of social choice functions selecting one of two alternatives (i.e. binary social choice). The domain of the functions we consider consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality and indifference is admitted. Strategy-proofness is meant to be coalitional: no group of agents has incentives to form a coalition that can manipulate the social choice for their own advantage with false reporting.
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference / Basile, Achille; Rao, Surekha; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - (2022). [10.1007/s00199-020-01273-1]
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
Achille Basile
;
2022
Abstract
We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy proof binary social choice functions. We give this characterization in the case of social choice functions selecting one of two alternatives (i.e. binary social choice). The domain of the functions we consider consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality and indifference is admitted. Strategy-proofness is meant to be coalitional: no group of agents has incentives to form a coalition that can manipulate the social choice for their own advantage with false reporting.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
