Supposizioni e logica della probabilità in Husserl (1902-1911)

Suppositions and Logic of Probability in Husserl (1902-1911) The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a pivotal position in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of phenomenological accessibility.