Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plaintiff files a lawsuit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated.

Costly pretrial agreements / Immordino, Giovanni; Anderlini, Luca; Leonardo, Felli. - In: THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0047-2530. - 48:(2019), pp. 159-188. [10.1086/699841]

Costly pretrial agreements

Giovanni Immordino;ANDERLINI, LUCA
;
2019

Abstract

Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plaintiff files a lawsuit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated.
2019
Costly pretrial agreements / Immordino, Giovanni; Anderlini, Luca; Leonardo, Felli. - In: THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0047-2530. - 48:(2019), pp. 159-188. [10.1086/699841]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/784713
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