Una rilettura critica dell’istituto della “ricapitalizzazione precauzionale” tra scenari ipotetici, vincoli sugli aiuti di Stato e (in)stabilità sistemica

This paper contains an analysis of the precautionary recapitalization tool which, in the new european framework for crisis control, gives member States the possibility to provide support to solvent banks with capital deficits highlighted by stress tests, in the event of a serious disturbance in the economy. Financial stability offers european authorities and national governments sufficient scope to determine when to provide aid. However, the use of this instrument is limited by fairly restrictive criteria, especially in the field of State aid. For these reasons, the survey focuses on the negative effects on financial stability that may derive from an excessively strict application of the burden sharing principle. The recent case of precautionary recapitalization of the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the parallel affair (although with different outcome) of the two “veneto banks” (VB e BPVi) and the resolution of Banco Popular Español, are here examined to test the goodness of the new european rules. To balance the need for the preservation of financial stability, taking into account the interests of competition policy, represents the challenge that the legislator, engaged in the BRRD reform process, will be called to restore credibility to this instrument.