Starting from Wittgenstein’s distinction between causes and reasons of an action, the paper presents two influential models in the methodology of explanation: the deductive‐nomological model elaborated by C. G. Hempel and the model based on Aristotle’s practical syllogism, in G. H. von Wright’s version. The controversy between methodological monism and methodological dualism, which has its roots in the opposition between explaining (Erklären) and understanding (Verstehen), is examined.

Cause e ragioni: modelli esplicativi nelle scienze della natura e nelle scienze umane

Pasquale Frascolla
2016

Abstract

Starting from Wittgenstein’s distinction between causes and reasons of an action, the paper presents two influential models in the methodology of explanation: the deductive‐nomological model elaborated by C. G. Hempel and the model based on Aristotle’s practical syllogism, in G. H. von Wright’s version. The controversy between methodological monism and methodological dualism, which has its roots in the opposition between explaining (Erklären) and understanding (Verstehen), is examined.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/731925
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