By means of a simple new characterization of ultrafilters, we elementarily prove, in the case of finitely many alternatives and arbitrarily large societies, that every coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function with at least three alternatives in its range is given by an ultrafilter. This provides an alternate and simple proof of results in Mihara (Soc Choice Welf 17:393–402, 2000). In case there are only two alternatives in the range of a coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function, we describe its structure, supplementing the work of Barberà et al. (Int J Game Theory 41:791–808, 2012).
On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions / Rao, Surekha; Basile, Achille; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN. - ISSN 2196-1093. - 6 (2018):1(2017), pp. 1-13. [10.1007/s40505-017-0129-0]
On the ultrafilter representation of coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions
Basile, Achille
;
2017
Abstract
By means of a simple new characterization of ultrafilters, we elementarily prove, in the case of finitely many alternatives and arbitrarily large societies, that every coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function with at least three alternatives in its range is given by an ultrafilter. This provides an alternate and simple proof of results in Mihara (Soc Choice Welf 17:393–402, 2000). In case there are only two alternatives in the range of a coalitionally strategy-proof social choice function, we describe its structure, supplementing the work of Barberà et al. (Int J Game Theory 41:791–808, 2012).I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.