Volontà, libertà e giudizio pratico: Malebranche e la sfera dell’agire

This article examines the Malenbranchian conception of practical judgement behind human activities, which is formulated with regard to those actions that incline individuals towards external objects. Firstly, through a comparison with the positions adopted by Descartes, Malebranchian distinctions between intellect and will, and between will and freedom are brought to the fore; there follows a discussion of Malebranchian theories on the drive towards good in general, as well as the desire for happiness as essential components of human existence. Finally, comes an analysis of the particular comparative examination directing human activities, to which Malebranche refers in some of his works, such as the Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce, that is to say, the operation which involves examining and comparing things that are considered to be good and which allow man to understand which ones are genuinely beneficial: in this regard, Malebranche emphasizes man’s ability to suspend his consent, meaning that he can look at a captivating object from a different perspective, and thereby become aware that inclination towards an object that captivates the soul for a certain period of time, is merely one of the possible modulations of his relationship with that object.