We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.
An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies / Koutsougeras, L. C.; Meo, Claudia. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - 66:2(2018), pp. 301-325. [10.1007/s00199-017-1068-6]
An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies
MEO, CLAUDIA
2018
Abstract
We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.File in questo prodotto:
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