We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provide a successful alternative to core notions of externalities (i.e., α-core, β-core and strong Nash equilibrium), which are typically empty. However, the stable sets do exist in situations where the above core notions are empty.
Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences / Graziano, MARIA GABRIELLA; Meo, Claudia; Yannelis, Nicholas C.. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 140:(2017), pp. 267-286. [10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.017]
Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences
GRAZIANO, MARIA GABRIELLA;MEO, CLAUDIA;
2017
Abstract
We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provide a successful alternative to core notions of externalities (i.e., α-core, β-core and strong Nash equilibrium), which are typically empty. However, the stable sets do exist in situations where the above core notions are empty.File in questo prodotto:
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