In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social exter- nalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N1 developed countries and N2 developing countries. For the lat- ter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.

Differential Game approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities / Mallozzi, Lina; Patrì, Stefano; Sacco, Armando. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1805-9406. - 9:(2015), pp. 135-154.

Differential Game approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities

MALLOZZI, LINA;
2015

Abstract

In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social exter- nalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N1 developed countries and N2 developing countries. For the lat- ter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.
2015
Differential Game approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities / Mallozzi, Lina; Patrì, Stefano; Sacco, Armando. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1805-9406. - 9:(2015), pp. 135-154.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/652429
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