In most economies, in particular in presence of uncertainty, a fair allocation does not exist. The main focus of this paper is on possibility of simultaneously resolving the equity and efficiency problems in economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We prove that if a cautious attitude towards uncertainty is socially accepted, then it is possible to have equitable and efficient allocations via a competitive equilibrium mechanism.
ARE ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED INDIVIDUALS IRREMEDIABLY ENVIOUS? / Pesce, Marialaura. - In: METROECONOMICA. - ISSN 1467-999X. - 68:1(2017), pp. 2-21. [10.1111/meca.12120]
ARE ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED INDIVIDUALS IRREMEDIABLY ENVIOUS?
PESCE, MARIALAURA
2017
Abstract
In most economies, in particular in presence of uncertainty, a fair allocation does not exist. The main focus of this paper is on possibility of simultaneously resolving the equity and efficiency problems in economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We prove that if a cautious attitude towards uncertainty is socially accepted, then it is possible to have equitable and efficient allocations via a competitive equilibrium mechanism.File in questo prodotto:
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