La solidarietà interregionale e il federalismo fiscale

Theoretical analysis, in general, agrees with Prud’homme’s affirmation (1995), that one of the “costs” of federalism consists in the concentration of resources in a limited number of territories and the expansion of fiscal disparities between sub-national governments. The economic model of solidarity (Garcia-Milà e McGuire, 2003; Calsamiglia, Garcia-Milà e McGuire, 2004) used in this work shows how the realization of the objective of reducing the discrepancies strictly depends on the degree of preference that the collectivity of the entire Country assigns to this objective, on the fiscal system which characterizes the financial relations between the various levels of governance of the Country, as well as on the means and mechanisms used to attain such aims. This work shows, in particular, that the means of “horizontal” equalization has a reduced efficacy with respect to “vertical” equalization aiming at eliminating or reducing the gaps in the supply of goods and services, especially in those countries that are characterized by strong economic discrepancies. In the case of Italy, the inclusion of solidarity in the function of social wealth, along with the aim of efficacy in the allocation of goods and services, would be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for the reduction of discrepancies. Law n. 42 (2009), instead, though only with regards to the funding system of the “autonomous” functions, proposes a system of “horizontal” equalization aiming at reducing but not eliminating the discrepancies between the mean fiscal capacity and that of the poor Regions. In the case of a country like Italy, instead, a system of “vertical” equalization would be preferable, as well as a value of the index of solidarity that annuls the differentials between fiscal capacities.