Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable. In Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68, 1181– 1229, 2000), the one-sided link formation model has been considered, which is based on a noncooperative game of network formation. In this paper, we first prove that network structures which play a fundamental role since they are strict Nash equilibria are in weakly dominated strategies whenever there are no strict Nash equilibria. Then, we exhibit a more accurate selection device between these network architectures by considering “altruistic behavior” refinements.

Equilibrium selection and altruistic behavior in noncooperative social networks

MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2009

Abstract

Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable. In Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68, 1181– 1229, 2000), the one-sided link formation model has been considered, which is based on a noncooperative game of network formation. In this paper, we first prove that network structures which play a fundamental role since they are strict Nash equilibria are in weakly dominated strategies whenever there are no strict Nash equilibria. Then, we exhibit a more accurate selection device between these network architectures by considering “altruistic behavior” refinements.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/359723
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