We study coalitional economies under uncertainty and asymmetric information, assuming a finitely additive measure space of agents and finitely many possible states of nature. We introduce a suitable core notion showing that it is equivalent to Walrasian expectations equilibria. The finitely additive approach proposed in the paper permits also asymmetric information economywith countablymany agents, rather than requiring only a continuum. Moreover, it allows us to overcome well-known criticisms related to the interpretation of individual private core notions.

Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies

BASILE, ACHILLE;GRAZIANO, MARIA GABRIELLA
2009

Abstract

We study coalitional economies under uncertainty and asymmetric information, assuming a finitely additive measure space of agents and finitely many possible states of nature. We introduce a suitable core notion showing that it is equivalent to Walrasian expectations equilibria. The finitely additive approach proposed in the paper permits also asymmetric information economywith countablymany agents, rather than requiring only a continuum. Moreover, it allows us to overcome well-known criticisms related to the interpretation of individual private core notions.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/334304
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