Abstract. An oligopolistic market in which several firms supply a homogeneous product is considered. One particular firm (leader) sets its decision prior to the other firms (followers), which react by playing a competition in quantities. The aim of the paper is to investigate the existence of suitable strategies for the leader in the presence of aggregative coupled constraints in the case in which (i) the aggregate quantity reaction Q is single-valued and (ii) the aggregate quantity reaction Q is set-valued and the leader has some probabilistic information on the followers choice in their reaction set.

On equilibria for oligopolistic markets with leadership and demand curve having possible gaps and discontinuities

MALLOZZI, LINA;MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2005

Abstract

Abstract. An oligopolistic market in which several firms supply a homogeneous product is considered. One particular firm (leader) sets its decision prior to the other firms (followers), which react by playing a competition in quantities. The aim of the paper is to investigate the existence of suitable strategies for the leader in the presence of aggregative coupled constraints in the case in which (i) the aggregate quantity reaction Q is single-valued and (ii) the aggregate quantity reaction Q is set-valued and the leader has some probabilistic information on the followers choice in their reaction set.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/203561
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