In this paper, the situation in which every player has an altruistic behavior, called friendly behavior, is incorporated into the general context of normal form games by introducing a new refinement concept (called friendliness equilibrium). Existence, properties and connections with another refinement concept, introduced by the authors in a previous paper and which captures an idea of reciprocal altruism, are investigated. Examples and counterexamples are given illustrating concepts, results and links with other classical refinement concepts.

Friendliness and reciprocity in equilibrium selection

MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2008

Abstract

In this paper, the situation in which every player has an altruistic behavior, called friendly behavior, is incorporated into the general context of normal form games by introducing a new refinement concept (called friendliness equilibrium). Existence, properties and connections with another refinement concept, introduced by the authors in a previous paper and which captures an idea of reciprocal altruism, are investigated. Examples and counterexamples are given illustrating concepts, results and links with other classical refinement concepts.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/203318
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 4
social impact