We propose a simple stochastic exchange game mimicking taxation and redistribution. There are g agents and n coins; taxation is modeled by randomly extracting some coins; then, these coins are redistributed to agents following Polya’s scheme. The individual wealth equilibrium distribution for the resulting Markov chain is the multivariate symmetric Polya distribution. In the continuum limit, the wealth distribution converges to a Gamma distribution, whose form factor is just the initial redistribution weight. The relationship between this taxation-and-redistribution scheme and other simple conservative stochastic exchange games is discussed.

Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games II. The redistribution game / U., Garibaldi; E., Scalas; Viarengo, Paolo. - In: THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL. B, CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS. - ISSN 1434-6028. - STAMPA. - 60:2(2007), pp. 241-246. [10.1140/epjb/e2007-00338-5]

Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games II. The redistribution game

VIARENGO, PAOLO
2007

Abstract

We propose a simple stochastic exchange game mimicking taxation and redistribution. There are g agents and n coins; taxation is modeled by randomly extracting some coins; then, these coins are redistributed to agents following Polya’s scheme. The individual wealth equilibrium distribution for the resulting Markov chain is the multivariate symmetric Polya distribution. In the continuum limit, the wealth distribution converges to a Gamma distribution, whose form factor is just the initial redistribution weight. The relationship between this taxation-and-redistribution scheme and other simple conservative stochastic exchange games is discussed.
2007
Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games II. The redistribution game / U., Garibaldi; E., Scalas; Viarengo, Paolo. - In: THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL. B, CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS. - ISSN 1434-6028. - STAMPA. - 60:2(2007), pp. 241-246. [10.1140/epjb/e2007-00338-5]
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/112714
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact