We study the incentives of regulated firmato acuire costly information under price cap regulation. We show that revenue sharing plans, in the spirit proposed by Sappington and Weisman (Inf. Econ. Policy 8 (1996) 229) can provide greater incentives for information acquisition than pure price capping and increase social welfare.

Price Cap Regulation,Revenue Sharing and Information Acquisition

STROFFOLINI, FRANCESCA
2005

Abstract

We study the incentives of regulated firmato acuire costly information under price cap regulation. We show that revenue sharing plans, in the spirit proposed by Sappington and Weisman (Inf. Econ. Policy 8 (1996) 229) can provide greater incentives for information acquisition than pure price capping and increase social welfare.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/111743
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