In a finite multicriteria game, one or more systems of weights might be implicitly used by the agents by playing a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding trade-off scalar games. In this paper, we present a refinement concept for equilibria in finite multicriteria games, called scalarization-stable equilibrium, that selects equilibria stable with respect to perturbations on the scalarization. An existence theorem is provided together with some illustrative examples and connections with some other refinement concepts are investigated.

A refinement concept for equilibria in multicriteria games via stable scalarizations

MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2007

Abstract

In a finite multicriteria game, one or more systems of weights might be implicitly used by the agents by playing a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding trade-off scalar games. In this paper, we present a refinement concept for equilibria in finite multicriteria games, called scalarization-stable equilibrium, that selects equilibria stable with respect to perturbations on the scalarization. An existence theorem is provided together with some illustrative examples and connections with some other refinement concepts are investigated.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/106807
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