First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter xn, converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (xn)n. Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated.

Approximations and Well-posedness in Multicriteria Games

MORGAN, JACQUELINE
2005

Abstract

First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter xn, converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (xn)n. Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11588/106793
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