We develop a generalisation of the lambda-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised lambda-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised lambda-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.
A generalised λ-Core concept for normal form games / Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Gilles, Robert P.; Mallozzi, Lina. - In: OPTIMIZATION LETTERS. - ISSN 1862-4472. - (2025). [10.1007/s11590-025-02233-1]
A generalised λ-Core concept for normal form games
Gilles, Robert P.;Mallozzi, Lina
2025
Abstract
We develop a generalisation of the lambda-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised lambda-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised lambda-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
