Alla ricerca di un linguaggio vivente. Intelletto e giudizio nel pensiero di Hegel dai frammenti giovanili agli scritti jenesi

Ever since his early fragments, Hegel ascribes the responsibility for the different forms of splitting that have torn the classical ideal of harmony to the Understanding (Verstand), which fixes life in dead conceptual schemas. The instrument par excellence of the Understanding is the judgment. It is not only a source of splitting, but holds a significant speculative meaning connected to the peculiar way in which Hegel assimilates the description of logical development to the gait of language. In this paper, we will try to focus on the dual function of the judgment, as it arises in the early fragments (§2), in Jena critical writings (§3), and in the Logic and Metaphysics of 1804/05 (§§4-5). Through the analysis of Hegel’s handling of judgment will emerge, by which the analytic power of the Understanding becomes a negative power, that is, the ability to break out of an epistemological model operating by identifications and splits to grasp itself as restlessness and movement.