

ADDITIONS, INTEGRATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE*

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Works by Arnold J. Toynbee

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[Arnold Joseph Toynbee], *The Case for Exploring the Ground (A Settlement with Turkey, I)*, in «The Manchester Guardian», August 4, 1921, p. 6. Special Article, signed «From our Special Correspondent in the Near East.

* *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee*, compiled by S. Fiona Morton, with a Foreword by Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

A SETTLEMENT WITH TURKEY I THE CASE FOR EXPLORING THE GROUND

by Arnold J. Toynbee

France, M. Briand has announced, is on the eve of peace with Turkey. Is peace possible between Turkey and Great Britain as well? I do not mean a peace written at Sèvres and Hythe and San Remo, with results as disjointed and visionary as the prophecies inscribed on the leaves and potsherds by the ancient Sybils. We achieved this kind of peace a year ago (though even that took us 18 months), and imposed it on an Ottoman Government whose writs hardly ran outside Constantinople. Twelve months' experience shows how little relation this patchwork document bears to peace in practice, and when M. Briand talks of peace he means something quite different – an agreement negotiated point by point with the Nationalist Government at Angora, with whom the *de facto* sovereignty over Turkey resides, and then endorsed by the Sublime Porte at Constantinople, where there is now a Ministry in harmony with the policy of Angora. If we want real peace in the Middle East we must walk along the same road as France, but this road needs a careful preliminary survey. The concrete issues between France and Turkey are not altogether the same as those between Great Britain and Turkey. Some parts of the way which were smooth going for France may be difficult for us, and, again, we may find an open road in places where France encountered obstacles. Certainly the time has come for us to reconnoitre the ground, and it would be a mistake to postpone this exploration until after the settlement of the more serious issues between Turkey and Greece. It is true that the three Allied Powers can hardly make a definitive peace with Turkey that doesn't include a settlement of the Greco-Turkish quarrel. It is apparently a cardinal point of the policy of Angora that any final arrangements made with the Powers should cover the whole field of the Turkish question, and this is not only prudent diplomacy from the Turkish point of view, it is a necessity of the situation, since

peace between Turkey and the Allies cannot lead on to political stability and economic reconstruction in the Middle East so long as the war between Turkey and Greece continues. At the same time, France has found the right method for Allied diplomacy in approaching first the direct issues between Turkey and herself, and we shall be well advised to do the same.

A Necessary Prelude to Allied Intervention

Sooner or later (and the sooner the better) the devastating war in Anatolia will have to be terminated by Allied intervention – an intervention which can only be effective if it is united, and in which we must therefore range ourselves whole-heartedly by the side of our allies. But until we have some certainty as to how we are going to stand with Turkey we shall hesitate to bring the requisite pressure to bear upon Greece. The Greek army was originally allowed to disembark at Smyrna, more than two years ago, to safeguard supposed Allied interests. It was a mistaken policy, for the Greek invasion has aroused more opposition to the Allies than it has been able to overcome, and has caused the Turkish regular army, whose effectives had fallen to something between 20.000 and 30.000 at the moment of the Greek landing, to rise again to the formidable strength of 200.000, at which it is said to stand to-day. None the less, this policy has been consistently pursued by our Government. Little more than a year ago they sanctioned and assisted a further Greek advance to Ushag, Brusa, and Ismid in order to interpose Greek forces between the Nationalists and the Straits; and though we have since parted company with Greece and formally proclaimed our neutrality in the Greco-Turkish war, we are still drifting in the direction of our old policy because we have not taken our bearing for a new course. We may be shocked at the recent atrocities of the Greek army in the region between Gemlik and Ismid, but perhaps we have a lingering feeling that its presence in Anatolia is still necessary to our own security at Constantinople and the Straits. We know that the Greeks are only too eager to remain our friends, and we are not sure whether Angora is ready to make friends with us.

But the recent Greek evacuation of Ismid has given us a glimpse of Angora's attitude which should encourage us to explore further. At Ismid a party of senior Allied officers

encountered the newly-arrived Nationalist forces and established perfectly friendly relations with their commanders. On the Ismid Peninsula the Greek army no longer stands between the Nationalist troops and the British units garrisoning the neutral zone. Since June 28 the Nationalist and the British forces have been in contact along the boundary of the zone without that boundary being crossed or any incident occurring. This shows that the suggestion of starting political discussions with Angora is not so outrageous or chimerical as it was commonly believed to be a few months ago, and as the Turcophobe "last-ditchers" would have it to be still. It is perfectly feasible, as well as necessary for clearing the way for intervention between Turkey and Greece. We cannot intervene impartially unless we know beforehand that we can come to terms with Turkey, and have, therefore, nothing to lose by doing justice between her and Greece. And unless we can intervene impartially we cannot intervene with success.